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More recently, attempts to secure lasting peace between Israel and Palestine through a Two-State Solution 2 have been central to U.S. diplomatic actions within the region.
While the U.S. has taken a comprehensive approach to resolve the conflict, there is an obstacle in furthering the agenda -security.
Within the U.S. government, the Department of State (DoS) is the lead agency for foreign policy. In peacetime, the Department of Defense (DoD) manages security assistance programs to reinforce policy and diplomatic objectives and promote regional stability. Most often these programs are designed to increase the military capacity and capabilities of foreign partners through training and material support. 3 However, in times of crisis, conflict, and war, DoD becomes more prominent, often assuming a temporary leading role. DoD aims to ensure allied victory and degrade enemy capabilities in order to establish a sufficiently secure setting in which diplomacy can resume. While DoD does not have the lead in determining U.S. foreign policy, establishing security and stability is a fundamental provision for successful political resolution and is most effectively undertaken by the military. 4 2 However, how is the DoS-DoD lead-support relationship altered when the unstable security environment exists between two governments, both nominally aligned to the U.S. and to U.S. interests? What if U.S. foreign policy goals include the requirement for both governments to succeed? This is precisely the situation in which we find ourselves regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
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The U.S. acknowledges that an enduring, peaceful resolution to the conflict will only be achieved through diplomatic agreement and mutual compromise between the Palestinian and Israeli governments. Despite comprehensive efforts, the 2007 geographical and factional split between Fatah and Hamas and violence has been the greatest obstacle to the Peace Process 6 . Diplomatic efforts have been unable to obtain sufficient security to allow either government to conclude an enduring political settlement.
The intent of this paper is to propose that the U.S. must place more emphasis on shaping the Palestinian-Israeli security environment. Specifically, DoD must commit itself to a long-term approach to increase the capacity and capability of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) and institutions. This will require a reexamination of the Departments of State and Defense authorities (including statutory authorities) and constraints in order to develop programs best suited to this long-term approach.
To understand this proposal, this paper provides a historical overview of the TwoState concept. This overview highlights how security has emerged as the foundational element of the Two-State policy of the U.S. and underscores the critical role of Department of Defense security assistance. Finally, current assistance programs for the PASF are examined and recommendations are made to enhance these efforts.
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This paper does not suggest a military intervention into the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, nor is it a critique of past or present U.S. policy. Moreover, it does not presume that a more favorable security environment will automatically and ultimately guarantee a final conclusion to the political struggle. 7 Rather, it exhibits that a unique politicalmilitary atmosphere has emerged in which it would be appropriate for Department of
Defense to serve as a leading element of foreign policy. These peace agreements were never intended to conclusively resolve each aspect of "final status," but simply outlined an incremental agenda to transition Occupied Palestine to statehood. This approach was agreed upon by both parties and set forth a pragmatic and gradual evolution toward Palestinian autonomy. The failure to 7 maintain a secure environment during the implementation of these plans ended each endeavor.
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir once stated that: "Security takes precedence over peace." 24 Not much has changed in the 27 years since his statement. Israel to take these risks, which creates the need for this partnership. 26 The state of affairs between Israelis, Palestinians, and the U.S. is, as one senior military officer described, a careful balance between "Israeli caution," "Palestinian impatience," and "hope;" in other words -Security, Statehood, and Trust. 27 Prior to Oslo the Accords, the U.S. provided no overt assistance to the government of Yasser Arafat and the PLO. 28 In 1993, with the creation of the Palestinian Authority, the U.S. initiated programs to transform Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) and other security and intelligence organizations into a single internal security force to conduct police and counter-terrorism operations. 29 Through 9 1995, the U.S. provided nearly $5 million toward this effort, 30 but relied primarily on regional and European nations to supply the majority of the resources and all security force training. 31 In 1996, in light of increasing Palestinian violence against Israel, President Clinton authorized U.S. agencies to provide direct aid to assist in restoring stability and subduing terrorist groups. 32 For the next several years, relative calm returned.
In March 2003, a multinational group known as the Quartet, consisting of the U.S., the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia, endorsed the "Road Map for
Peace" and began to solicit international assistance to fulfill its provisions. Unlike preceding peace plans, the Road Map was brief and concise. It included tightly-phased sets of "performance-based" and "goals-driven" objectives. 33 The plan called for broad- Israeli incursions into Gaza, NSF units maintained order and prevented civil disturbance throughout the West Bank. 55 The most striking aspect of these operations was the tremendous level of communication, cooperation, and coordination between the PASF and the IDF. 56 Israeli officials generally support the USSC program, routinely citing both the PA forces' greater effectiveness as well as increased and sustained levels of security cooperation. 
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Several of the recommendations below suggest that the USSC should serve as a lead agent within the U.S. and the international effort. Within the context of this paper, a lead agent's authority is implicit and is not synonymous with authoritative command, as one would find in a military unit. The goal of lead agency is to achieve unity of effort.
Unit of effort is defined as: "coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily from the same command or organization." 64 Unity of effort is achieved through the common agreement of goals and priorities, and does not confer upon the lead agent the authority to dictate the actions of other organizations.
Recommendations for the near-term: the level of assistance provided within the previous USSC plan to train and equip ten NSF security battalions, to include 2 PG battalions, improve security infrastructure, and assist the reform efforts within the PA Ministry of the Interior has been accomplished. 65 Any plans to increase the scale of this program at the present time would likely exceed the ability of the MOI to manage and sustain. Therefore, near-term improvements to the USSC should focus on institutionalizing the mission and preparing for expanded future requirements.
The Coordinator (chief of the USSC, currently Vice Admiral (VADM) Bushong)
should have a DoD-recognized Joint Management Document (JMD) that includes the specifications of service, rank, and skill set. Personnel management within the USSC is based upon the interagency memorandum that limits the size of the U.S. contingent.
Any temporary or permanent changes must be coordinated and approved by the signatories to the establishing memorandum. This limits the ability of the VADM Bushong to adapt the team's personnel strength and competencies to meet the changing requirements of the mission. A JMD would confirm the requirements for regional, language, training assistance, and intelligence expertise and the responsibility for the Services to train and prepare service members prior to their assignment. The USSC should be authorized a dedicated budget from DoD. Palestinian Security Sector Reform is a long-term obligation that will take many years to accomplish. The USSC must plan and program resources well in advance for the Palestinian security force to achieve the operational capability. The current year-to-year funding provided by DoS is not adequate to project and commit funding, nor is it flexible or robust enough to respond to significant changes that arise. 71 Within this dedicated budget, should be provisions offered to other high-priority missions. These provisions include; the ability to spend appropriated funds over several budget years and the authority to use funds to support non-military security organizations. Multi-year funding would provide the flexibility needed to adjust programs to the rate at which Palestinian security forces progress. The ability to fund civil a security force allows the USSC to train the NSF battalions in the advent they assume a law enforcement role. Finally, this dedicated budget provides the ability to fund the training PA civil police if they begin to work in close concert with the NSF. should be left to the discretion of the Coordinator. 73 The Department of Defense should consider reestablishing the USSC as a Joint Task Force (JTF). 74 Establishing a JTF would alleviate most of the issues mentioned above, without counteracting the authority of the Consul General in Jerusalem or the Ambassador in Tel Aviv. Establishing a JTF would require DoD to take responsibility for the financial and personnel through individual augmentation orders, and would mandate the development of a Joint Manning Document. 75 If a JTF is adopted, DoD should consider establishing it as a Combined JTF (CJTF). Our International partners currently account for nearly two-thirds of the USSC.
Their contributions are immense, through the skills, knowledge, and experience they bring that are atypical of U.S. service members. Additionally, a CJTF would make it easier to institutionalize foreign partner contributions. Finally, although the USSC is performing its mission in superior fashion, it is still managed as an ad hoc, temporary organization. This point is not lost among our Palestinian, Israeli, and foreign military counterparts. The creation of a CJTF would demonstrate the permanence of our commitment and would reinforce the importance the U.S. places on its efforts. 76 Recommendations for the mid-term: the Palestinian security forces and the Ministry of the Interior are currently receiving as much assistance as they can manage.
Newly-trained PASF battalions will undoubtedly continue to build the confidence of the Palestinian people and possibly erode some of the popular support for militant factions.
However, this will not be enough. The PA will have to contend with the security threat posed by terrorist organizations and illegal militias. The PASF will require new units, training, equipment, and intelligence capabilities. Additionally, in order to sustain the support of the Palestinian society, USSC efforts must be integrated with those of other government agencies to improve social, economic, health, and educational conditions.
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In the coming years, the USSC should be given the authorities and resources to reinforce PASF counter-terrorism capacity building training, in addition to law and order and civil disturbance control. After years of investment by the USSC to gain the trust and confidence of the Palestinian and Israeli leadership, it would be unwise to transfer this mission to another department or agency. However, as a DoD organization, the USSC is restricted from providing certain types of training to foreign counter-terrorism forces, police units, and intelligence agencies. 78 
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With the expanded mission to build counter-terrorism capability within the PASF, the U.S. needs to reestablish the CJTF as a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF). 79 Once the PA commits itself to combating terrorism, the U.S. must be postured to reinforce all elements of their government. A JIATF alleviates some problems caused by certain DoD restrictions. The JIATF, recognized as the lead agent for security capacity building and counter-terrorism, would be able to access the capabilities and resources of non-security related departments and agencies within our government.
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For factions willing to disarm and demobilize, the PA will need help during the reconciliation process. For irreconcilable militant organizations, the PA will require assistance in creating strong military, police, intelligence, and judicial capabilities and infrastructure. Additionally, the PA will require the support of non-DoD agencies to assist in providing meaningful health, education, and economic incentives to maintain the support of the Palestinian people. Therefore, if a JIATF is considered, the U.S.
should consider establishing it as a Combined JIATF (CJIATF) for the same reasons a CJTF was recommended previously. 81 The U.S. should establish an intelligence analysis and information sharing system within the JIATF to assist Palestinian counter-terrorism operations. Palestinian security forces will require support to locate and track the terrorist threat that resides within its borders, as well as the threat posed by foreign nations and non-state organizations. Without robust assistance, these operations will quickly exceed the capability of the Palestinian intelligence services. The U.S. has learned during the past twelve years of countering terrorism that we can only be effective through combined 22 efforts and intelligence sharing within our own government and in cooperation and coordination with our partners and allies. 82 Recommendations for the long-term: after a stable and secure environment is established and the Palestinian Authority and Israeli governments reach a lasting peace agreement, DoD assistance will still be required. The U.S. is currently preparing to transfer certain DoD programs and activities in Afghanistan to the DoS, as it did in Iraq.
Similarly, some of the JIATF efforts will be transferred once stability and peace are achieved. While the Palestinian Authority will need extensive support in establishing a functioning government and economy, these activities will clearly belong to DoS. 83 The future Palestinian State will continue to be subject to the influence and threats from other states and external non-state actors. Palestine will likely become the target of violence, just as happened to Egypt and Jordan following their peace agreements with Israel. Additionally, these external actors will continue to attempt to use Palestine as a staging ground for attacks against Israel. The Palestinian government and security forces will require DoD assistance for many years to come. Kuwait. 85 Nonetheless, DoD must be prepared to maintain a sizeable security assistance presence in Palestine comparable to the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq.
In conclusion, the Palestinian government and society have a tremendously difficult journey ahead as they strive for full statehood. Without a credible PalestinianIsraeli peace process, Palestinians will be stuck in their long and tenuous attempt to build a state while still under occupation. 86 To stay the course, they will require partners who are dedicated to providing the required assistance needed. Only the U.S. has the means to organize and sustain the international effort that will be required. Likewise, only DoD has the resources and expertise to ensure the permanence of the security assistance effort. However, the current effort will not carry us through to a Two-State Solution. The opportunity exists now to set the conditions for these future requirements and ensure that the U.S. is ready to respond when needed. 87 Just as a final resolution must be the mutual creation of the Israeli and the Palestinian governments and people, so too must the shared security of each nation.
The U.S. government cannot force a peace arrangement upon these two governments.
Likewise, the U.S. must resist the temptation to press for changes before both Israelis and Palestinians are willing and able to accept the associated risks. As stated earlier, the peace process is a delicate balance of security, patience, and trust. Any attempt by the U.S. to seize control of the security agenda, for any reason, will be a breach of trust against our partners from which U.S. relationships with those partners might not recover. 
